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NOTES
Competition in Legal Services Under the
War on Poverty
Equal justice for every man is one of the great ideals of our society. This is
the end for which our entire legal system exists. It is central to that system that
justice should not be withheld or denied because of an individual's race, his reli
gion, his beliefs or his station in society. We also accept as fundamental that the
law should be the same for the rich and for the poor.1
Lawyers must bear the responsibility for permitting the growth and con
tinuance of two systems of law-one for the rich, one for the poor. Without a
lawyer of what use is the administrative review procedure set up under various
welfare programs? Without a lawyer of what use is the right to a partial refund
for the payments made on a repossessed car?
What is the price tag of equal justice under law? Has simple justice a price
which we as a profession must exact?2

The creation of the legal services programs of the war on poverty has
focused attention on the deficiencies in the legal treatment of the poor.3
Despite general agreement that the poor need legal services/ however, there
has been a continuous debate over the control of the legal programs and the
proper role of the poor in administering them.5 Behind the dispute over
control is a difference of opinion about the goals of the legal services pro
grams. Because these programs were established to help fulfill the policy of
the Economic Opportunity Act of I964 "to eliminate the paradox of pov
erty in the midst of plenty,"6 the goals and means of the war on poverty
should be a primary consideration in evaluating the programs.
1. THE WAR ON POVERTY
The Economic Opportunity Act is made up of seven titles, which to
gether attempt to mobilize the human and financial resources of the United
1. Powell,The Response of the Bar, 51 A.B.A.J. 751 (1965).
2. Address by Senator Robert F. Kennedy,Law Day at University of Chicago Law School,May I,
1964,quoted in Cahn & Cahn,TIle War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317, 1336
n.27 (1964).
3. See, e.g., P. WALD, LAw AND POVERTY: 1965 (1965); CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THE Ex
TENSION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR (Stats. ed. 1964); Symposirlm on Legal Services to the Poor,
41 CAL. ST. B.J. 215 (1966).
4. See, e.g., E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER 'VHEN NEEDED 39-58 (1963); 'VALV, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 6-67; Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 381 (1965).
But see Freeman,How Great Are the Needs?, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 232 (1966).
5. Compare Baumbach,Shall the Poor Choose Their Own Counsel?, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 275 (1966),
with Matthews,Armageddon in San Francisco, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 284 (1966).
6. § 2,42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964).
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States to combat poverty.7 Some of the programs are experimental-such
as Project Head Start for preschool education and the Job Corps for high
school dropouts. Much of the war on poverty program, however, is a de
vice to concentrate the forces presently fighting poverty into one new agency
-the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)-in order to coordinate the
effort and especially to reemphasize the need for dealing with the prob
lems of the poor. A vigorous new agency with a mandate to end poverty
can supposedly spur old-line organizations to greater efforts by forcing them
to reaffirm their obligations and to revamp their methods in order to im
prove their services to the poor. Hence, cooperation and funding through
existing organizations is not an end in itself, but was conceived as a means
to achieve the goals of the war on poverty.
A. Community Action: Stimulation and Coordination
The heart of the effort to combat poverty is the community action pro
grams in title II of the act. The purpose is "to provide stimulation and in
centive for urban and rural communities to mobilize their resources to com
bat poverty . . . ."8 Programs may be set up under this title for remedial
reading, literacy courses, employment counseling, homemaker services, or
any other program which will "combat poverty."9 Legal services are con
sidered part of the effort to combat poverty.l0
Community action programs are initiated on the local level and are
directed to attack the particular problems of that community. "The long
range objective of every community acti9n program is to effect a permanent
increase in the capacity of individuals, groups, and communities afflicted by
poverty to deal effectively with their own problems so that they need no
further assistance."l1 Community action, like the war on poverty as a
whole, emphasizes the concept of coordinating and funding through exist
ing organizations-welfare agencies, school districts, recreation depart
ments, civic organizations-to provide better, more vigorous services in
the future. The community action ideal is to create a city which, "with the
prodding of federal funds, unifies its welfare programs and 'enters into a
binding agreement to pull itself up by its own bootstraps.' »12
7. Title I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 27II-61 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965), provides for the Job
Corps and other youth programs; title II, 42 U.S.C. 2781-2831 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965),
is the community action provision; title IIII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2841-81 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I,
1965), covers special rural programs; title IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2901-07 (1964), provides small-business
incentives; title V, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2921-23 (1964), as amended, (Supp. I, 1965), authorizes payments
for experimental job training for adults; title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2941-67 (1964), as amended, (Supp.
I, 1965), governs the administration and coordination of the act; title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2981 (1964),
governs the effect of antipoverty payments on a person's rights to social security benefits.
8. § 201, 42 U.S.C. § 2781 (1964).
9. 1 OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, COMMUNITY ACTION PROGRAM GUIDE 23-28 (1965).
10. I id. at 27.
II. I id. at 7.
12. Comment, Participation of the Poor: Section 202(a)(3) Organizations Under the Economic
Opporttlnity Act of I964, 75 YALE L.J. 599, 603 (1966) (quoting Sargent Shriver, Director of the
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B.

Community Action: Maximum Feasible Participation

Community action programs were created with the congressional man
date to include the "maximum feasible participation" of the poor.13 This
mandate marks a dramatic step away from the traditional charitable ap
proach to poverty, which many have condemned as a failure.14 The inten
tion that the poor are to be involved to the maximum feasible extent suggests
a concept of helping the poor to help themselves, rather than merely doling
out services to them. The poor are to join in the "planning, policy-making,
and operation of the program.»l5 The theory is that "[b]y maximizing ac
tive participation of the poor, we instill in them a new sense of dignity, a
new awareness of the processes by which their lives are determined, and a
new opportunity to be masters of their own destiny.»lS
Maximum participation has the further advantage of allowing and en
couraging the poor to make their collective desires felt through their rep
resentatives on local community action boards. Community action boards
are the policy-making bodies that, subject to approval of OEO, formulate
and administer local community action projects. Since the community ac
tion boards are composed of representatives of local government and civic
organizations as well as representatives of the poor, an endeavor must be
made to set up the community action boards to ensure that they will be
responsive to the needs and desires of the poor. For example, E. Clinton
Bamberger, Jr., former director of the legal services program of OEO, sug
gested that the policy-making boards of the legal services program should
be "obliged to hear and act upon [the] suggestions»l.7 of the representatives
of the poor. In effect, the act promises the poor a means of lobbying for what
they believe to be in their best interest. Since the democratic process re
lies frequently on articulation of grievances and on special-interest groups
and since the Congress has expressed the policy that the poor should be aided
in expressing their point of view, extensive participation by the poor in the
administration of the community action programs seems to be a natural
and necessary part of the war on poverty.18
Office of Economic Opportunity). The unified program is needed to "curb the trend toward separatism"
by creating "umbrella agencies" which "impose cooperation and encourage experimentation among
conservative social service functionaries." ]d. at 602-03.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2782(a) (3) (Supp. 1, 1965).
14. See, e.g., Baumbach, stlpra note 5, at 276; Address by E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., Former Di
rector of Legal Services, Office of Economic Opportunity, to Lubbock County, Texas, Bar Ass'n, Feb.
4, 1966. Mr. Bamberger asserted that "simple charity may do more harm than good to its recipients."
15. I OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 7.
16. Bamberger, op. cit. stlpra note 14.
I7. Ihid.
18. A recent amendment to the Economic Opportunity Act reaffirmed the concept of maximum
representation of the poor by requiring that one-third of a community action board be representatives
of the poor. Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. 89-794, § 203, 80 Stat. 1457. If tbis minimum does not be
come a maximum as well, the poor may become more involved in their own destinies.
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C. Community Action: Conflict
There has been, however, a continuing controversy about the exact
meaning of "maximum feasible participation" of the poor.19 Such participa
tion may pose a threat to those in positions of political power. If the poor
control the policy decisions of a program affecting them, they may well
choose to challenge the existing political power structure. Many city of
ficials have exerted political pressure to avoid having control of the com
munity action programs put into the hands of the poor.20 They interpret
"maximum participation" to mean merely that the poor share in the ad
ministration of lower echelon activities such as neighborhood day-care and
employment centers.21 Such an interpretation removes from the community
action programs the revolutionary concept which makes the war on pov
erty more than an enlarged welfare program.
The opposition to substantial control by the poor goes beyond city of
ficials to many groups whose position or actions might be challenged by
an articulate and powerful group of the poor. The existing organizations
through which OEO had planned to channel its funds might well be at
tacked by the poor.22 It appears that OEO has had to bow to political pres
sure in many of its community action programs and largely eliminate ex
tensive participation of the poor.23 But when a conflict occurs, the goals of
the war on poverty as a whole should take precedence over the pledge of
working through existing organizations; cooperation was conceived as
merely a means of stimulating the war on poverty effort and should there
fore be discarded if it stifles that effort. OEO should explicitly demand a
certain minimum adherence to the goals of the war on poverty before fund
ing projects.
II. LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS
The legal services programs, which are part of community action, also
have dual policies of cooperation and maximum participation. The role of
lawyers in the war on poverty should be clarified to evaluate the legal ser
vices programs and to determine whether those dual policies can accom
modate each other.
19. See Carter, Sargent Shriver and the Role of the Poor, The Reporter (San Francisco), May 5,
1966, at 17. The three most common interpretations are: (I) involvement of the poor in social service
activities; (:2) a literal interpretation, according to which a neighborhood representative serves on the
community action boards; (3) active political organizations of the poor. Comment, 75 Y.u.E L.J. 599.
60:2 (1966).
:20. See Comment, 75 Y.u.E L.J. 599, 61Q-II (1966).
:21. ld. at 599-600, 61Q-II.
:2:2. For example, welfare departments have been cited as agencies which should be more respon
sive to the wishes of the poor. See Cahn & Cahn, supra note 2, at 1341-44; Wickenden, The Indi
gent and Welfare Administration, in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THE EXTENSION OF LEG.u. SERVICES
TO THE POOR 41 (Stats ed. 1964).
23. See Carter, supra note 19, at 17.
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A. The Need for Legal Services
The poor have lacked the aid of lawyers in the past, and this has con�
tributed to and aggravated their poverty.24 Lawyers have been unavailable
to the poor in the normal lawyer-client context to meet immediate personal
legal crises. Examples are rife of poor people who have been victims of
illegal credit practices.20 Without a lawyer a poor person remains ignorant
of his right to restrict the circumstances in which his wages may be at
tached and his job jeopardized. A lawyer might well save a poor person
from having an unlawful contract enforced against him. A lawyer can put
a poor person through bankruptcy if his financial situation calls for a fresh
start. Individual legal services can thus help to alleviate some of the most
degrading and frustrating aspects of poverty.
However, lawyers can provide broader aid to the poor, aid which should
have even greater influence than individual services on the improvement of
the position of the poor in the long run. For example, a poor person with a
credit problem may be given a temporary reprieve by a legal defense or
bankruptcy, but the heart of his problem is that his reputation as a bad credit
risk has forced him to do business with unscrupulous dealers. A group of
poor people could form a credit union, however, to offer the poor man fair
credit terms.26 And legal help is required to establish a credit union. "Maxi
mum participation of the poor" in this context is very important in that
a lawyer must be apprised of the interests of the poor as a group. The
request made to a lawyer may be no more articulate than, "We are getting
unfair treatment on credit. What can we do?" A lawyer can translate such
a complaint into action.
Lawyers may also assume the role of advocates of the group interests of
the poor by acting as lobbyists for legislation favorable to those interests or
by pursuing test cases to challenge old laws and practices or to develop new
legal theories benefiting the poor. A lawyer may be able to help the poor
force a city administration to enforce long-ignored housing codes or to
provide school facilities equal to those of wealthier neighborhoods.27
24. See Bamberger, op. cit. supra note 14.
25. See, e.g., Caplovitz, Conmmer Prob/ems, in CoNFERENCE PROCEDINGS: THE EXTENSION OF
LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 61 (Stats ed. 1964); Dunham, Consumer Credit Problems of the Poor
-Legal Assistance as an Aid in Law Reform, in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL CoNFERENCE
ON LAW AND POVERTY 9 (Wolf ed. 1965).
26. See King, Credit Unions and Financial Counseling, in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: CONSUMER
ACTION AND THE W AR ON POVERTY 15 (1965).
27. The breadth of service which lawyers can provide for the poor is discussed in Cahn & Cahn,
supra note 2, at 1334-52. Areas of the law, in addition to consumer credit, where poor people may
encounter hostile laws include landlord·tenant, family law, and welfare administration. See generally
\VALD, op. cit. supra note 3, at 6-41; CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL CoNFERENCE ON LAW AND
POVERTY 1-66 (Wolf ed. 1965); CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: CoNSUMER ACTION AND THE \VAR ON POV
ERTY (1965); CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: THE EXTENSION OF LEGAL SERVICES TO THE POOR 17-69
(Stats cd. 1964).
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Legal Services in the Context of the War on Poverty

Because improvement of the position of all the poor is the ultimate ob
jective of the war on poverty, a program like legal services which has the
ability to deal with the broader interests of the poor should be designed to
do so. The OEO legal service guidelines indicate an appreciation of the
breadth of needed legal services. They call for civil legal work, education,
preventive law, and advocacy of appropriate reforms in statutes, regulations,
and administrative practices.28 The focus is both on the individual with a
specific legal problem and on the poor as a group which needs effective ad
vocates for its collective interests. E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., explicidy stated
the goals of the legal program in an address to the National Conference of
Bar Presidents:
We cannot be content with the creation of systems of rendering free legal as
sistance to all the people who need but cannot afford a lawyer's advice. This pro
gram must contribute to the success of the War on Poverty. Our responsibility is
to marshal the forces of law and strength of lawyers to combat the causes and
effect of poverty. Lawyers must uncover the legal causes of poverty, remodel the
systems which generate the cycle of poverty and design new social, legal and po
litical tools and vehicles to move poor people from deprivation, depression, and
despair to opportunity, hope and ambition.29

C.

Bar Monopoly on Legal Services

Most of the legal services programs funded thus far fail to fulfill the
broad goals of the war on poverty. Few programs have progressed beyond
providing individual legal services.30 Inadequate funding makes it im
possible to provide the full span of legal services/l. but there is no reason
that individual services should be given exclusive priority. The failure of
the present programs to emphasize the interests of the poor as a group may
stem from the OEO policy of cooperating with the existing groups serving
the poor, since the interests of the group which controls the program may
determine priorities.
The legal aid societies have for many years been the primary organiza
tions offering legal services to the poor.32 The local bar associations support
them with both financial aid and volunteer help ;33 the legal aid society and
28. See I OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, op. cit. supra note 9, at 27.
29. Address to the National Conference of Bar Presidents, Feb. 19, -1966.
30. The various descriptions of funded programs published by local OEO legal services offices are
available on request from Director of Legal Services Program, Office of Economic Opportunity, Wash
ington, D.C. Even in Oakland, California, where there is a good legal services program, the offices have
been so swamped that little effort to educate the poor or to help the poor as a class has been possible.
Telephone Interview With Simon Rosenthal, San Mateo County, Cal., Legal Services Project, Nov.
16, 1966 (formerly in the OEO Oakland program).
31. See Am. B. News, July 15, 1966. Many of the projects funded thus far have no more than
skeleton budgets. Interview With Simon Rosenthal, supra note 30.
32. Voorhees, Legal Aid-Current Needs, New Directions, in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NA
TIONAL CoNPERENCE ON LAw AND POVERTY 67 (Wolf ed. 1965).
33. Ibid.
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the local bar association are usually partners in providing services for the
poor. At the start of the legal services program, OEO made the tentative
determination that no programs would be funded which were not approved
by the dominant local bar association.34 This veto power allowed local bar
associations to control legal services programs.3S
Is granting a bar monopoly consistent with the goals of the war on
poverty? The bar associations are generally sympathetic to the goal of in
dividual legal services for the poor, with some exceptions. For example,
many bar association members have argued that divorces should not be
granted on a gratuitous basis,36 and bankruptcies, along with domestic rela
tions cases, have often been omitted from the kinds of cases legal aid so
cieties would handle ;37 nonetheless, the approach of the bar to the prob
lems of the poor does not necessarily conflict with the principle of free
individual legal services for the poor.
However, the structure of the bar associations and the attitudes of those
who control them may make them unsympathetic to the broader purposes
of the legal services programs. In California, for example, control of the
state bar is largely in the hands of the board of governors of that body. Since
participation on the board is a time-consuming responsibility, generally
only members of large firms can afford to participate.3s Bar associations on
the city level tend to follow the same pattern, though on a smaller scale.39
One would assume that members of larger firms tend to be removed from
the problems of the poor.
The California bar's reaction to the question of permitting group legal
services may indicate the bar's reaction to OEO projects which provide
broader services. The California bar conceded the need for increased legal
services; however, it shelved the proposal which recommended changes in
34. Interview With James Goodwin, Former OEO Official, at Stanford, CaL, May 6, 1966.
35. Almost all of the 160 legal services projects funded in the first year of the legal services pro
gram had bar approval; legal aid societies were often the sponsors of the funded projects. OFFICE OF
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, REpORT OF THE LEGhL SERVICES PROGRAM TO THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIA
TION I (1966); Shriver, National Policy, 41 CAL. S T. B.J. 219, 223 (1966).
36. "People may say that poverty prevents the poor from having the same rights to get a divorce
as a person with money. Yet we must remember that obtaining a divorce is not a right, but a privilege.
For most legal aid clients a separation is just as useful and practical as a divorce." Frankel, Experiments
in Serving the Indigent, in CoNFERENCE PROCEEDINGS: NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON LAw AND POVERTY
69,72 (Wolf ed. 1965) (quoting a chief attorney in an eastern legal aid office).
37. For example, the Oakland Legal Aid Society did not handle either of these types of cases be
fore its funding by OEO.
38. In the last ten years the president of the board of governors has always been from a firm with
a business-oriented practice. A profile from the Martindale-Htlbbell Law Directory for the ten-year
period would show that the president has been from about a twenty-five-man firm with a civil practice
in all state and federal courts. Specialties have almost always included corporate practice along with
work in the fields of insurance, probate, oil and gas, real property, or sucli. The present board of
governors is made up of seventeen lawyers who also fit the general pattern which has typified the
president of the board. Among the officers, the average firm size is near twenty-three; the firms of the
officers all specialize in corporate and other business practice.
39. The San Francisco Bar Association, for example, has on its board ten members of large firms
and five from small firms in the five-to-ten-member range. Almost all the lawyers specialize in corpo
rate, probate, personal injury, or commercial law.
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the Califomia Rules of Professional Conduct to allow limited use of group
legal services programs as a method of providing more services.40 The bar,
even after admitting the need, did not explain why legalizing group legal
services was an unsound method for expanding legal services.41 Tbis atti
tude is an obstacle in the road to any significant innovations in the field of
legal services for the poor.
Some sense of the difficulty OEO has had in achieving the goals of the
war on poverty because of its decision to work through the bar can be
further seen in the bar's initial reaction to the legal services program. When
the idea of adding an extensive legal services program to the community
action program was first suggested, bar associations across the country re
sisted it.42 A great deal of fear was generated about "socialized law" and
about the loss of the bar's independence which supposedly would follow
any intrusion of the federal government into the field of law.43 There was
also considerable speculation that some lawyers might lose clients.44
Mter much persuasion and political pressure, however, the American
Bar Association agreed to cooperate with OEO. On February 8, I965, the
House of Delegates of the ABA passed a resolution which pledged coopera
tion with OEO in the "development and implementation of programs for
expanding availability of legal services to indigents," but limited the ser
vices to "programs [that] utilize to the maximum extent deemed feasible
the experience and facilities of the organized Bar such as Legal Aid."45 The
resolution explicitly recognized that the bar had tried in the past to extend
legal services to lower-income groups; it further indicated concern about
the unfilled need for legal services and noted "an urgent duty to extend
and improve existing services."46 Before pledging to work with OEO, the
resolution cautioned: "Freedom and justice have flourished only where the
practice of law is a profession and where legal services are performed by
trained and independent lawyers."47
The resolution can be considered a step toward bar cooperation with the
40. See Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, Board Resolution re Group Legal
Services, May 22, 1965. In marked contrast to the attitude of the board of governors is the attitude
expressed by Justice Traynor in Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 225 P.2d 508, 519
(1950) (dissenting opinion). "Given the primary duty of the legal profession to serve the public, the
rules it establishes to govern its professional ethics must be directed at the performance of that duty.
[individuals] the effective legal assistance they need
Canons of ethics that would operate to deny
can be justified only if such a denial is necessary to suppress professional conduct that in other cases
would be injurious to the effective discharge of the profession's duties to the public."
41. Sel! Board of Governors of the State Bar of California, Board Resolution re Group Legal
Services, May 22, 1965.
42. Interview With Charles Baumbach in San Francisco, May 7, 1966 (lawyer who helped draft
the San Francisco legal services project approved by OEO).
43. Sel! N.Y. Times, May 16, 1966, § I, at 13, col. 1.
44. Sel! Address by Jerome Carlin, National Lawyers Guild Convention, Nov. 12, 1965, in 24
GUILD PRACTITIONER 132 (1965).
45. 51 A.B.A.J. 551 (1965).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
•

•

•
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war on poverty, but it is not by any means without conditions, explicit and
implicit. For example, the bar and its associations must be used to the
maximum feasible extent. In addition, the resolution leaves uncertain
whether the bar will back programs seeking to promote the interests of the
poor as a group. The bar's statements have emphasized only the availability
of funds from the Government, and not at all the goals of the program. The
local bars seem more interested in obtaining the OEO funds before other
groups do than in furthering the aims of the war on poverty.48
In apparent recognition of the shortcomings of bar-supported proposals,
OEO has begun to emphasize that any group may apply for funds and that
the best program will be accepted, regardless of bar approval.49 This alterna
tive to programs sanctioned by the bar will prod the bar into supporting
more far-reaching proposals only if some of the projects not supported by
the bar are funded. Otherwise the local legal services programs will remain
under the control of the local bar associations. Since bar-supported proposals
have generally not provided for broad legal services for the poor, OEO
should fulfill its pledge and thereby end the bar monopoly.
III. EMERGENCE OF COMPETITION: SAN FRANCISCO

A major test of OEO's policy priorities occurred recently in San Fran
cisco. A controversy arose after two applications for funding of legal ser
vices projects were submitted to OEO, one with and one without approval
of the bar groups.GO The extent of the controversy indicates one of the rea
sons for OEO's policy of obtaining bar approval. The differences between
the ways in which the two groups approached the problems of the poor and
between the projects which they envisaged provide additional insight into
the relative merits of various groups seeking to be funded.
The San Francisco bar groups realized in 1965 that OEO money was
available and that it could be used to help expand legal aid facilities. How
ever, the proposal submitted to OEO jointly by the San Francisco lawyers'
associations and the San Francisco Legal Aid Society was not at all exten
sive or imaginative.G1 The proposal was not based on any consultation with
the poor. It essentially retained the philosophy that the sole purpose of a
legal aid program is to provide individual legal services, and it merely pro48. See Cal. St. B. Rep., Feb. 1966, at 1. The ABA has recendy passed a resolution calling for
doubling of funds but still did not indicate that it would back. programs incorporating a broad con
cept of legal services. See Am. B. News, July 15, 1966.
49. See Bamberger, Basic Principles, 41 CAL. ST. B.J. 224, 227 (1966).
50. The San Francisco Lawyers' Club and the Bar Association of San Francisco submitted the one
proposal along with the San Francisco Legal Aid Society. The two lawyers' groups include well over
92% of all San Francisco attorneys. See Matthews, supra note 5.
51. Thomas Rothewell of the San Francisco Legal Aid Society asserts that OEO originally told
the bar to submit only a small proposal. When the bar followed this suggestion, OEO turned down the
proposal because it was not "large enough." Telephone Interview, April 20, 1966.
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posed to extend existing services somewhat. The proposal seemed to do
exactly what the state bar was urging the local bars to do-submit a proposal
in order to retajn control of the direction of the OEO legal services pro
grams. In most areas of the country the bar's proposal would probably have
been considered an adequate extension of services.
However, San Francisco is unique in that a majority of its community
action board are poor people.52 This is important since legal services pro
posals are submitted to the local community action board for suggestions,
approval, or rejection.53 The board's decision is not binding on OEO, which
makes the final decision on funding; however, an expression of opinion by
a board cannot easily be overlooked by OEO. When the proposal supported
by the bar was submitted to the board, it was rejected as inadequate,54 and
the board suggested that the proposal be rewritten.
While the bar groups and the legal aid society revised their proposal,
another proposal was drafted by a small group of San Francisco lawyers
led by Charles Baumbach. This group drafted the rival proposal because
they believed that the bar had not adequately considered the interests of the
poor.55 The group held extensive negotiations with the community action
board, and the final proposal reflected the desires of the poor. The proposal
called for advocacy of the "individual and collective causes" of the poor.56
Legal services would not be limited under the proposal to traditional services
for individual clients; legal education- and advocacy of changes in existing
inequitable laws would receive equal priority. The proposal stated that its
lawyers would provide a "loud, clear, informed voice to those persons whose
education, background, or economic condition left them silent."57 The pro
posal also provided for majority control of the governing board by repre
sentatives of the poor; it assumed that the lawyers in the program would be
legal counsel for the poor and would respond to their collective needs.58
52. Lemuel H. Matthews, former president of the San Francisco Bar Association, considers this a
"questionable distinction" and not at all a part of the war on poverty. Matthews, supra note 5, at 284.
Charles Baumbach sees the arrangement as the only one consistent with the aims of the war on poverty.
Baumbach, supra note 5, at 277.
53. See OFFICE OF ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 6--7
(1966).
54. "Rudely rejected; in fact, they didn't even look at it." Interview With Lemuel H. Matthews,
Former President, San Francisco Bar Association, in San Francisco, May 7, 1966.
55. Interview With Charles Baumbach, St/pra note 42. It is rumored that OEO in Washington
helped to encourage the proposal in order to spur the bar into greater action, imagination , and com
mitment. Interview With James Goodwin, supra note 34. Lemuel H. Matthews, former president of
the Bar Association of San Francisco, saw a "devious plot" in the second proposal. He reports that
members of the "other group" came to the bar's meetings and stalled the bar's second proposal until
the other group could go to the poor people and convince them to support the nonbar proposal. Inter
view With Lemuel H. Matthews, supra note 54.
56. See San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, Opening Statement of Appli
cation for Community Action Program, 1966.
57. Ibid.
58. "The Governing Board will substantially represent the poor people through their Target Area
Boards and is in the position of a client retaining a law firm." San Francisco Neighborhood Legal As
sistance Foundation, Scope and Context of Application for Co=unity Action Program, 1966.
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The revised proposal of the bar groups contrasts with the rival proposal
in several respects. The bar proposal emphasized mainly an extension of in
dividual legal services. The sole provisions for services on behalf of the
broader collective interests of the poor were programs for education and a
stipulation that each lawyer write two articles per year on problems of the
poor.�9 The issue which caused the most conillct between the bar and nonbar
groups was the question of participation of the poor in the program. The
bar proposal provided that one-third of the governing board would be com
posed of representatives of the poor.60
When the two proposals were considered by the community action
board, the nonbar proposal was approved unanimously, while the bar pro
posal was rejected unanimously.61 The representatives of the poor had
expressed their choice. Both proposals were then sent to OEO for final con
sideration. The bar groups put strong pressure on OEO not to break prece
dent and reject the bar proposal. Thus, OEO faced the dilemma caused by
its dual policies of cooperation with the organized bar and maximum par
ticipation of the poor. OEO had committed itself to cooperating with exist
ing organizations, in this case the legal aid society and the bar associations.
But the aims of the war on poverty called for approval of the nonbar pro
posal if the idea that the poor should be encouraged to do things for them
selves was not to become an empty slogan.
At OEO headquarters it was first suggested that both proposals be
funded by OEO.62 However, the local community action board was against
any acceptance of the bar-supported proposal. On the other hand, the bar
association put strong pressure on OEO not to take control out of its hands.
OEO finally decided that both proposals could not be funded without going
against the wishes of the poor. The next approach was therefore to modify
the nonbar proposal to place more bar association members on the govern
ing board. The bar first wanted majority control by its members,63 but
later assented to a plan calling for a majority made up of lawyers.64 The
plan finally approved called for a majority to be elected by the poor with the
stipulation that a majority of the board be lawyers.
The modified version which is now beginning operation seems to rep
resent the ideal toward which legal services under the war on poverty
should strive, although it violates the policy of funding only bar-approved
59. Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, Bar Association of San Francisco, & Lawyers' Club of
San Francisco, Application for Neighborhood Legal Services Conduct and Administration Grant, Dec.
I965·
60. Ibid.
6I. See Matthews, Armageddon in San Francisco, 4I CAL. ST. B.J. 284 (I966).
62. Interview With Art Somora of the San Francisco Economic Opportunity Council, in San
Francisco, April 29, I966.
63. SeeThe Recorder (San Francisco), Feb. 3, I966, at I.
64. See San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, Explanation of Application for
Community Action Program, I966.
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projects. The proposal was drafted after consultations with the poor, and it
incorporated provisions desired by the poor. It gives full vent to the "maxi
mum feasible participation" concept in both the development and manage
ment of the program. Majority representation of the poor on the board
should ensure communication of the problems and desires of the poor and
provide substantial pressure not to ignore those desires. The San Francisco
program will demonstrate whether a legal services project can promote the
interests of the poor as a group as well as provide effective individual legal
services. It will also test the theories behind maximum participation of the
poor and the bar's attitude toward an aggressive legal services program.
The bar has already announced that it has two primary reservations re
garding majority control of the legal services program by representatives of
the poor. First, the bar fears misuse of Government funds.65 Considering
the enormous amount of funds which the legal services board can direct,
there is a possibility that its members will be tempted to direct usage of the
funds to advance the goals of their own political groups.66 But the bar for
gets that those in control of the board are supposed to be representatives of
the local poor, and what the bar might consider misuse of funds might well
follow the desires of the poor. Moreover, there are interested parties who
will be watching what the poor on the board do with the money under their
control. The legal services project must account to OEO for all funds, anq
OEO may cut off the funds if it detects any misuse. In addition, the bar
association will undoubtedly keep a close eye on the actions of the poor, and
it can quickly bring pressure to bear if any abuses are found. The problem
of misuse is thus probably overstated and must be weighed against the ad
vantages of participation and control by the poor.
The second major fear of the bar is that control by the poor may en
danger the professional independence of lawyers participating in the pro
gram. The theory is that a lawyer will not merely be serving his client but
also the legal services board. For example, a lawyer could not easily bring a
suit against the local community action board to challenge a board election
on behalf of a losing candidate, since the same board would have control
over his employment contract. Such a refusal to represent a client would
probably be detected very quickly, however, since the bar continues to
scrutinize the activities of all lawyers in the program.67 The bar has further
6 5. See Matthews, supra note 61.
66. The proposal calls for over $600,000 of federal funds. See San Francisco Neighborhood Legal
Assistance Foundation, Explanation of Community Action Program, 1966. Lemud H. Matthews im
plied several times in an interview that some of the leaders of the poor and those interested in them
has "ulterior" motives connected with revolutionary changes. Interview With Lemuel H. Matthews,
supra note 54.
67. The proposal recognizes that the lawyers' activities will be scrutinized. Complaints based o n
evaluation o f the merits o f a ca s e or the legal strategy to be followed will be referred to the state bar
association. See San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, Appendix to Application
for Community Action Program, 1966.
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alleged that the use of "test cases" may impair the interests of a particular
client.6B The poor-controlled governing board might direct lawyers to push
certain kinds of cases to help the poor's interests as a whole. However, if a
particular client wants to stop at a certain stage of litigation or to take a
different approach to the case, the Canons of Ethics guarantee his right to
do SO.69 Constant observation and pressure from the organized bar will en
sure the independence of the attorney-client relationship and thus minimize
the possibility that the interests of the particular client will be sacrificed for
the common good as seen by the governing board.70 In addition, the San
Francisco program as adopted provides that complaints about a lawyds
handling of a case be referred to the California State Bar Association.71
Furthermore, the governing board does not have the power to interfere
with the discretion of the attorneys. It makes only general policy; for ex
ample, it might specify categorical priorities for cases to be taken if funds be
come limited.72
CONCLUSION
Although the bar has expressed fears concerning the project in San
Francisco, it has indicated that it will cooperate with the program. The legal
aid society is presendy applying for a supplemental grant under the nonbar
project to expand its own operations.73 Considering that the bar predicted
the demise of the legal aid society if its proposal was not funded,T4 this atti
tude marks a step toward cooperation. If the fears of the bar groups are not
realized and if the bar chooses to cooperate with the funded proposal, the
resulting situation may be a turning point for OEO. The chances of any
substantial harm resulting from the San Francisco program are probably
not great, considering all the checks which have been included. The great
need for legal services for the poor and the need to determine the feasibility
of control by representatives of the poor make the funding of this proposal
a major testing ground.
68. Telephone Interview With Thomas Rothewell, supra note 51.
69. The proposal �tates that all "rules and canons of the legal profession will be followed." San
Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, Appendix to Application for Community Action
Program, 1966. The Business and Professions Code in California provides: "
wilfully and without
authority appearing as attorney for a party to an action or proceeding constitutes a cause for disbarment
or suspension." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 6104 (West 1962).
70. But see In re Co=unity Action for Legal Services, Inc., 35 U.S.!.. WEEK 2270 (N.Y. App.
Div., Nov. 15, 1966), in which a court refused to authorize a corporation which was to provide legal
services. The ground for objection was that the lawyers in the program would be ultimately subject to
lay control. The court held that the corporation "must be directly controlled and supervised by lawyers
summarily responsible to the court for the maintenance of professional standards." The members of
the co=unity must limit themselves to "broad questions of policy."
71. See San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation, Appendix to Application for
Co=unity Action Program, 1966.
72. See ibid.
73. Interview With Edgar H. Scholl, Public Relations Director for the Bar Association of San
Francisco, in Palo Alto, Cal., Sept. 29, 1966.
74. See Matthews, supra note 61, at 286.
•
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The primary significance of the San Francisco experience may be its
demonstration that the bar does not have a monopoly on the approval of
legal services programs. Mter the San Francisco experience, a bar associa
tion would be unwise to apply for OEO funds without consulting with the
poor and trying to meet their desires. The San Francisco experience should
also give encouragement to those who would like to develop programs in
line with the philosophy of the war on poverty, for they are no longer faced
with the requirement of bar association approval.
The reactions of the ABA and the San Francisco bar groups indicate the
flexibility of these organizations; both went from initial opposition to legal
services programs under OEO to cooperation. The process of educating the
bar to the needs of the poor and the philosophy of the war on poverty should
be continued. The needs of the poor are greater than any presently available
services can satisfy/5 and all avenues of aid should therefore be utilized. It
is hoped that what has occurred in San Francisco will help develop a crea
tive competition which will be a continuing part of the effort to aid the poor.
Eric W. Wright
75. See Westwood, Legal Aid's Economic Opportunity, 52 A.B.A.T. 127 (1966).
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